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Integration is a metaphysical fundamental 
 
 
What are the fundamental constituents of reality? While the ancient Greeks 
explained the world around them in terms of earth, air, water, fire, and ether, ancient 
philosophers in the Eastern Asian tradition understood reality in terms of yin-yang (陰陽), 
taiji (太極), and lichi (理氣). Although contemporary philosophers (e.g. Kim 1993; Putnam 
1994; Penrose 1994) approach this classic metaphysical question primarily from the 
perspective of physicalism and/ or naturalism, what remains unclear on these approaches 
is the relationship between physical and mental phenomena, between electromagnetic 
force on the one hand and consciousness on the other. While most contemporary 
philosophers reject dualism—the idea that the physical and the mental are distinct 
metaphysical realms—they accept the distinction between electromagnetic force and 
consciousness. However, if dualism is fully to be rejected, an alternative metaphysical 
framework is needed for understanding reality holistically. Two of alternative frame 
works that may help to provide a holistic understanding are concepts of process 
(Whitehead 1929) and integration (Zisi 2014). In this article I explore the latter concept. 
The notion of integration (誠) can be found in the Zhongyong, one of the key texts 
of Confucian philosophy. Many readers have understood the word “誠” of the Zhongyong 
to mean sincerity or faithfulness. However, while the concept does have certain 
anthropological or ethical connotations, its primary meaning is to be metaphysical. I 
interpret the Zhongyong to imply that integration is a metaphysical fundamental. In what 
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follows I argue for the following three claims: that integration is essentially information 
consciousness (Section 1), that integration is a dispositional power (Section 2), and that 
information is ubiquitous (Section 3). Taken together, these three claims will support the 
main contention of this article—that integration is a metaphysical fundamental. 
 
The character of integrational consciousness 
 
Anderson (1981) identifies the following three functions for his integrational theory 
of information: the valuation function maps stimuli; the integration function adds and 
prioritizes the subjective values of information; and the response function translates 
internal impressions to external responses. For Anderson, human beings are the subjects 
of integration while external states of affairs are the objects of exclusively human 
integration. 
To the extent that Anderson limits integrational information to human 
representation, he follows a Kantian model of representation. But some philosophers have 
extended integrational information from human to natural representations. For these 
philosophers, everything in the world is an information processor. Dretske (1988), for 
instance, believes that all things maintain their own proto-beliefs while they depend on 
environmental information. He holds that two systems a and b can fit to each other so that 
Fa and Fb can be correlated. Millikan (1993) introduces the notion of a proper function 
to a biological individual so that information processing is not mysterious but is rather 
determined biologically. And Chalmers (1996) believes that even rocks are in a proto-
phenomenal state, or state of pseudo-consciousness, when they expand or extract. 
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I tend to reject both Kant’s representationalism and Dretske’s naturalization in 
favor of an integrational view of consciousness. In my view, consciousness is neither a 
subject of representation nor an object for naturalization; rather, consciousness <is> an 
integral state of things or an act of integration. In order to explain this view more fully, I 
will first discuss the notions of proto-consciousness and intentionality, showing how 
proto-consciousness can be attributed to inanimate things and how it can develop into 
person-consciousness. I will also clarify the relationship between the intentionality of 
human beings and that of natural beings. These concepts of proto-consciousness and 
intentionality will then be used to explain the sense in which the consciousness of 
information is a metaphysical fundamental. 
 
Proto-consciousness 
 
If the human body is a product of evolution, so too is the human mind. Evolutionary 
explanations can be given, not only for the basic bodily processes of digestion, excretion, 
and so on, but also for the operations of the mind, such as reflection, judgment, and belief-
formation. But if the human mind has evolved, then there must be some hint of mentality 
not only in recent evolutionary history, but also in the much more distant ancestors of 
human beings. If this were not the case, then the human mind would have come about 
through some external intervention, which is incompatible with the theory of evolution. 
One is therefore led to accept a qualitative continuity between proto-minds (i.e. proto-
consciousness) and human minds. 
For the purposes of this article I define ‘consciousness’ as ’awareness from a first 
  4 
 
person perspective’. Accordingly, while different people may be aware of the same state 
of affairs, they cannot have the same consciousness. I assume that things as information 
processors are integrators, which enjoy proto-consciousness. But this is not to say that all 
things have proto-consciousness. It is important in this context to distinguish between the 
proto-consciousnesses of panpsychism and that of integrationism. Panpsychism is a form 
of property dualism 1  that holds that proto-consciousness is distinct from physical 
properties and can, under the right conditions, blossom into the consciousness of human 
beings or what I will call ’person-consciousness’. However, integrationism rejects 
property dualism and insists, not that everything in reality <has> proto-consciousness, 
but rather that everything <is> proto-consciousness. 
The evolution of the mind started with proto-consciousness, which is an 
information processor, and later developed into person-consciousness, which is a 
reflector. The difference between the two forms of consciousness can be understood in 
terms of their relative degrees of abstraction. Two arguments can be given in support of 
this point. The first argument attributes a first-person perspective to all information 
processors. In particular, since I am a human being, I have a first-person awareness of 
what it is like to be a human person, although the question of what it is like to be a bat 
does not fall within the scope of my first-person awareness. But while the first-person 
awareness in consciousness is of course limited to the occupier of consciousness this 
limitation cannot be used as a basis for denying a first-person perspective to other 
information processors.2 The second argument in favor of the aforementioned point 
involves observing the degree of complexity of person-consciousness in the information 
processing found in human beings and then extending that observation to other kinds of 
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information processors in the world. While proto-consciousness is a simple information 
processing state, person-consciousness consists of various states of informations. For 
example, an unpleasant feeling is person consciousness with layers of sub-conscious 
states interacting with each other, such as a default state that is systematically structured, 
an input state of initial information, a state involving the evaluation of the information 
against the structured system, a state consisting of the result of the evaluation, and a 
negative state which is interpreted as being unpleasant. 
Recent scientific evidence, as reported by Kolata (2017), offers some support for 
this idea that proto-consciousness can be extended to all things. J. C. Hall, M. Rosbash, 
and M. W. Young isolated the gene that controls circadian rhythms in fruit flies and 
thereby advanced the understanding of the biological clock in human beings. Their 
discoveries indicate that the period gene encodes cellular proteins, which accumulate at 
night and disseminate during the day, controlling behavior like sleep, body temperature, 
metabolism, and hormone levels. When these researchers modified the period gene in 
fruit flies, the flies lost their circadian rhythm. These discoveries also help to explain how 
plants, animals, and humans have biological rhythms that are in sync with the rotation of 
the earth.  
 
In seeing the scientific discovery of Hall et al. as an illustration of the fact that 
proto-consciousness can be extended to all things I am assuming that proto- 
consciousness does process informations and, hence, that it is integrational. But this 
assumption seems to be a safe one since without it, the activities of the period gene in all 
organic agents are inexplicable miracles. 
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The modal intentionality of integration 
  
What exactly is implied by the claim that integration is informational 
consciousness? Integration involves intentionality in the sense that integrational power is 
directed toward the harmony and totality of the phenomenal world. When things process 
informations in any given situation they have the properties of intentional consciousness. 
Things in the actual world are intentional, but they also have modal intentionality in the 
sense that they are intentional in all possible worlds. If they were not modally intentional, 
they could not be dispositional; nor could the harmony and integration of all things have 
been maintained in terms of the laws of nature. While there have been some attempts to 
explain the relation between dispositions and intentionality in terms of physical 
intentionality, none of these attempts has been entirely successful. For this reason I take 
an alternative approach, one that identifies dispositions and intentionality. 
Mumford and Anjum (2011) tried to explain the harmony of the natural world in 
terms of intentionality and dispositionality. For them, causation is a disposition toward a 
result, and a result is obtained in the degree of integration of causes at a threshold. The 
relevant notion of threshold is clarified as follows: the causal power of any given event 
consists of the addition and subtraction of the various powers. When one strikes a match 
to light a fire, the fire is obtained by the addition of combustibles (the striking of the 
match with sufficient force, the presence of oxygen, etc.) and the absence of significant 
wind or moisture. They believe that the addition and subtraction of causal powers clarifies 
the notions of disposition and physical intentionality as well. They maintain a traditional 
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dualism when they claim that intentionality is mental whereas dispositions are physical. 
Yet they go beyond the philosophy of Carnap when they allow for the possibility of some 
connection between the two. 
Molnar (2003) attempts to strengthen the relation between intentionality and 
dispositions. He expands intentionality to the realm of the physical, insisting that 
intentionality is the mark of a disposition, and claims that while dispositions maintain 
directness, ubiquity and totality, intentionality provides structure. Molnar recognizes both 
the similarities and the differences between mental and physical intentionality. In mental 
intentionality, its objects may or may not exist, may or may not be ambiguous, and can 
even be referentially opaque. Molnar believes that physical intentionality shares these 
characteristics, although he does not deny or overlook the differences between the two 
forms of intentionality.  
Molnar’s attempt to connect intentionality with dispositions is novel but not 
entirely successful. Precisely because he maintains a distinction between the intentional 
and the physical, he cannot establish any necessary connection between the two even 
though he sees them as having many similarities.3 One suggestion for overcoming this 
problem is to define ’disposition’ as a power of manifestation and then claim that 
dispositions are not intentional. If so, then a disposition would be either some mysterious 
power or a power manipulated by an external subject of some sort. But this supposition 
is not acceptable since it would imply that a disposition could not execute its power, which 
is contrary to the definition. Therefore, one can conclude that dispositions must be 
intentional. Since intentionality is a modal element of a disposition, a top-down approach 
may be appropriate. Molnar’s thesis, thus revised, is the claim that intentionality as a 
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disposition is a metaphysical fundamental. 
 
Integration: the harmony and totality of causation 
 
Suppose that integration at its initial stage is proto-consciousness. Does it then take 
place as an act or rather as a non-actional event? And does it come from something 
external or rather internal? I will now argue that integration itself is the power of 
integration. Consider first the fact that integration reveals itself as a type of fitting. To 
borrow an example from Williams (2010), imagine a glass of cool water with ice cubes 
in it and with the water melting the ice cubes. The relevant events (i.e. the cooling of the 
water and the melting of the ice cubes) are integrational events that fit each other; they 
are structured in terms of reciprocity, innateness, and essentialism. In this section I will 
argue that this causal structure realizes harmony and totality. If correct, this idea supports 
the view, which is based on the metaphysics of integration, that the agents of integration 
are integrators, executing integrational powers. 
Among the many aspects of integration that are in need of explanation or elaboration, 
two that Martin (2008) focuses on are the possibility of reciprocal causation and the 
simultaneity of the various elements involved in events such as the cooling of the water 
and the melting of the ice. Explaining how various dispositional properties manage to 
combine into one wholesome totality is called ‘the task of harmony’. If one accepts that 
dispositional causation is ubiquitous, then most dispositional states of affairs both help 
certain states to occur and restrain other states from occurring. The world of dispositional 
properties is therefore called a ‘busy world’. Explaining how it works is known as ‘the 
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task of totality’. 
A further challenge is to explain how the various individual things in this world are 
involved in this harmony and totality. Two approaches are possible: one involving 
explanations of a general structure; the other involving explanations of active structure. 
General structure explanations, such as those provided by Molnar (2003) or Mumford and 
Anjum (2011), start with the assumption that integration is a primitive modality. Without 
this assumption causal analyses would be either empty or circular. Additionally, 
integration on this approach is understood by analogy to how semantic holism, as 
advocated by Williams (2010) and others,  explains linguistic phenomena. Just as the 
meaning of any individual belief depends on the meanings of all other beliefs in the 
system, the power of a property in an individual thing depends on the powers of all other 
properties in the system. Third, as Molnar (2003) points out, Brentano’s notion of 
intentionality can be expanded to include physical things, thereby structuring the roles 
that dispositional properties execute. 
The foregoing explanation helps to clarify the general structure of integration. The 
integration of an individual object is a disposition of that object to adjust to its surrounding 
environment by forming relations with other objects and by deepening its structures. Even 
when the integration of an object is not manifested, the individual object is disposed to 
do so. Integration is a disposition to respond creatively in accordance with the embedded 
objective of an individual as it meets new situations. 
 
Active explanations of integration: the integration theses 
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The active explanation of integration is an explanation of the autonomy of 
integration that sheds light on the power to bring about fitting, harmony, and totality, 
whereas the conceptual explanation of integration is a formal explanation of how 
individual objects may realize fitting, harmony, and totality. As I have argued elsewhere 
(e.g. Chung 2016), the active explanation involves the following five theses of 
integrational metaphysics, which are derived from the Zhongyong: (1) The integration of 
an individual object is a property of power which realizes its embedded objective in a 
context in which it interacts with all other individual objects; (2) ‘mind’ refers to a 
capacity of all individual objects that are able to process relevant information; (3) 
integration is a capacity, not only of human minds, but of all individual minds; (4) if our 
evolutionary history exemplifies the survival of the fittest, then that history also exhibits 
the evolution of both stronger intelligence and better justice; (5) integration is a property 
of realizing the ideal that any individual object seeks in a given situation. 
It will now be shown that integration is active and agential. Traditionally, the 
concept of agency has been bundled up with the concepts of responsibility and thought, 
and hence limited to beings that are accountable (i.e. persons). This tradition also reflects 
a Cartesian dualism, according to which there is discontinuity between mind (thought) 
and matter (that which is extended). On this view, it is conceptually possible for a person 
not to have a body but impossible for a person not to have a mind. However, few 
contemporary philosophers are willing to accept the discontinuity thesis of dualism, and 
it is indeed implausible to identify a person with pure thought. Of course, a human person 
consists of both a mind as well as a biological body, but it is important to note that a 
person’s mind and body are connected with the minds and bodies of other persons and 
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other integrators in the natural world in the sense that they influence and depend upon 
each other. Their connections are the result of each of them processing informations in 
accordance with their own embedded objectives. 
What does it mean to say that individual objects realize their embedded objectives 
in particular situations? Let us consider this question with respect to human beings. Some 
of Chomsky’s insights are helpful in answering this question. Descartes believed that 
even the most foolish human can learn how to speak a language whereas the most 
intelligent animal cannot and that the human capacity to learn language is due to the fact 
that humans have souls. However, for Chomsky, Cartesian dualism cannot explain how 
syntactic and semantic rules turn scribbles and sounds into meaningful sentences. 
Observing that a child’s first seven years of exposure to language enable the child to 
master a language, Chomsky (1965) proposed that the human brain is equipped with an 
innate language-learning module, a language acquisition device. 
By extending the thesis that individual objects realize their embedded objectives in 
particular situations to natural beings, one can overcome some of these Cartesian 
reservations. In particular, one may question the relevancy of the dualist’s perspective 
that only humans can think, act, or be held responsible. One may also deny the alleged 
discontinuity of mind and body on the basis of which it is said that humans alone can 
think and act. Contemporary science suggests that, not only human beings, but all natural 
beings, are active agents of information processing. 
 
Integration is a power 
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In the previous section I advanced the idea that integrators are active agents. In this 
section I will argue that the relevant notion of integration is first-person, as opposed to 
third-person, agency. The integration of an individual object is the power to realize its 
embedded objective in the process of interacting with other objects. The structure of this 
integration might be understood as follows: an individual a and other individual b 
integrate into an individual c. However, problems arise with this third-person 
interpretation in which the unit of integration is taken to be the individual object. On the 
other hand, if integration has a first-person structure, then the units of integration may be 
presented as spatio-temporal states of individual objects: an individual object m, taking 
the first-person perspective, integrates m’s present state, S₁, and another individual n’s 
present state, S₂, into m’s next state, S₃. 
Since I claim that an individual object is the first-person agent of integration, I 
assume the concept of a dispositional power, which has been defended by other 
philosophers. Kim (1993a) endorses causal powers as well as the following principle of 
property identity: if A and B are properties then A=B if and only if A and B make the 
same contribution to the causal powers of an actual or possible agent. Heil (2003) rejects 
the default view, advanced by Prior, Pargetter and Jackson (1982), that solubility or 
fragility are single properties, a view based on the understanding that categorical 
properties are basic while dispositional properties are higher-order properties. Instead, 
Heil proposes that solubility or fragility belong to a family of properties of realization. 
However, the powers of a property are not higher properties; rather, they are ordinary 
properties that should be investigated empirically.  
 
  13 
 
Heil’s view that dispositional properties are powers, much like ordinary properties, 
has evolved into the idea, defended by Harre and Madden (1975), that an object is a field 
of power rather than a spatio-temporal individual and also that the world is a network of 
powers rather than substances of interactions. On this view an individual object is reduced 
to a bundle of properties as well as to the powers of those properties, as represented by 
the following diagram from Holton (1999).  
    
   a∙      b∙ 
   c∙      d∙ 
 
Suppose that a world consists of four points (a, b, c, and d) organized as follows: a 
is on the left of b and above of c; b is on the right of a and above of d; c is on the left of d 
and below of a; and d is on the right of c and below of b. Each point has its own proper 
relation with other points and the relationships among the four points shows nothing other 
than that the system is the network of pure powers. Points here have neither spatio-
temporal extension nor location. The world too can be seen as a network of powers, which 
suggests that integration as a dispositional power is a metaphysical fundamental.   
 
Pan-text: information is ubiquitous 
 
Reality consists, not of monads or noumenal objects, but rather of informations. It 
is also a system that is calculated in terms of probable causality and governed by 
Einsteinian physics. Assuming that informational physicality is sustainable, as Kuhlmann 
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(2015) suggests, reality is better understood in terms of an integration theory than of a 
representational truth theory. While arguments in favor of informational physicality 
should appeal to proper physics, in this section I will offer other sorts of considerations 
in support of this view. I suggest that all things, including human thoughts, are texts of 
informational physicality and that ordinary language is therefore dependent on 
informational physicality.  
Reality is a text for human beings because of its informational physicality. And 
while reality comes from informational physicality, the converse is not the case—
informational physicality does not come from reality. 4  What humans see exists 
independently of human consciousness but at the same time it becomes the content of 
human perceptions. What one <sees> and what one <sees as> are not identical; rather, 
they share isomorphic structure. What one <sees> is informationally physical and guides 
what one <sees as> for each structure of information to coincide. This is the way how 
human perceptions are to be texts. Informations are ubiquitous. 
Thoughts can have the content of informational physicality. In order to see how this 
is so, consider the distinction between narrow and wide content. Human thoughts, such 
as beliefs or decisions, are subjectively independent as well as communally constructive. 
For example, human decisions such as Barack’s decision to propose to Michelle or 
Trump’s decision to fire Comey carry narrow as well as wide mental content. These 
events reflect intra-personal as well as inter-personal relations with others. A decision, 
such as a proposal or a firing, is personal but also holistic in the sense of a having wide 
mental content that is constituted by the community of which the decision-maker is a part 
(Lee 1994, Kim 1996; Chung 2001).5 Since the decision is holistic, the decision-makers’ 
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subjective mental content and the communally constructed mental content are both 
significant.  
The ubiquity of ordinary language is another consideration in support of the idea 
that things are informational. Thus, while the beliefs associated with any given religion 
can conflict substantially with those of any other religion, ordinary language enables 
people of different religions to communicate with each other. In this sense ordinary 
language is what I have elsewhere called an intersectional system (Chung 2013). The 
informational physicalities of reality allow for intersectional systems like ordinary 
language through which the integration of various elements can be realized. In spite of 
the special characteristics of particular religions or other theoretical frameworks, the 
inter-sectionality of ordinary language makes the ubiquity of information possible.  
 
The integration test 
 
Information is not only ubiquitous but also integrational. If information were not 
integrational then there would be conflict at various levels. While this reductio argument 
in support of the integrationality of informations is straightforward, the idea itself should 
be pursued further. Though all things are integrational, there are various ways in which 
they are integrational. Since each object or event carries its own mark of integration, it 
should be possible to provide some criteria or tests for determining the way in which any 
bit of information is integrational. 
To the hypothesis that any state of affairs is information, Choi et al. (1998) have 
proposed an alternative view that any state of affairs can be information, since a 
  16 
 
thermometer’s graduation marks or a glass window’s ice flowers are first encoded in order 
to be information. These physical representations are not propositions but rather marks to 
be encoded or interpreted. I believe that marks can be understood as syntactic structures. 
These syntactic units are open to various semantic interpretations. Syntactic units as non-
cognitive processes can be turned into semantic units as cognitive processes (Rim 1999, 
Floridi 2010, and Floridi 2017). While physical marks are not themselves propositions 
prior to being interpreted they form a syntactic chain that enables information processing 
to produce an appropriate semantic interpretation. 
Information is integrational to the extent that it is syntactic. Information is also 
integrational in that it consists of webs of properties of states of affairs, which can be 
understood in terms of dispositions. Property dispositions, physical or mental,6 obey 
rules of information processing, and they are integrational as one property engages with 
other properties actively and positively. Such integration can yield something which is 
novel, while states of affairs are inter-connected. For example, the bricks of a house are 
separate units but their dispositional properties can be integrated into a brick house. The 
cold compression of an ice cube is not the result of the simple combination of various 
elements of the ice cube; it is rather a higher property resulting from the interactions of 
the properties of those elements. The hypothesis that information is ubiquitous is 
tantamount to the claim that all things are informational or that there is no thing that is 
not informational. Therefore, the hypothesis is empirical in nature. But it can also be 
tested by means of a thought experiment. Suppose that a given thing is not informational. 
Then there is no way that it can interact with anything else in the world, for it does not 
have a structure in which it can assume any role to play in this world. It would be either 
  17 
 
a thing that does not belong in this world or a thing that does not exist. Either way it 
would not be admissible in this world. 
 
Location 
 
I have argued that since information is ubiquitous, integration must also be 
ubiquitous. However, if integration were not ubiquitous, could information still be 
integrational? This question raises the possibility that the ubiquity of information and the 
ubiquity of integration might be coincidental. Perhaps they arose simultaneously as 
opposed to one preceding the other, just as space and time are thought to coincide with 
the singularity of the Big Bang.7 If so, the simultaneity of the integration of information 
and the ubiquity of integration may be another sort of singularity. 
The ubiquity of integration also receives support from Whitehead’s insight that 
each of all locations has its own aspects in all other locations (Whitehead 1925; 1929). 
Accepting the electromagnetic field of mathematical physics, Whitehead maintained that 
since all spatio-temporal locations are interconnected and reflect the inter-connected 
structure of the world, all spatio-temporal objects have spatio-temporal fields. Similarly, 
all bits of information may have their own aspects in all other bits of information. The 
content of all bits of information reflects the complex structure of the world, and the 
contents of these bits of informtion are, directly or indirectly, connected to each other. 
Thus, the contents of all bits of information have a field of semantic extension. 
 
The analogy to Whitehead’s insight on location may be extended even further. 
  18 
 
Whitehead introduced the notion of an actual occasion as a metaphysical primitive. An 
actual occasion is not what an enduring substance manifests in physical terms but is rather 
the process of becoming in the spatio-temporal fields in which all objects are located. The 
laws that condition these fields are the generality of activities of world fluctuations in 
which all events are instantiated (Whitehead 1920). Though Leibniz’s monads are 
windowless, Whitehead’s actual occasions are all windows; and though Kant’s world is 
that of a transcendental subject, Whitehead’s world is one in which mind and body or 
subject and object are organically intertwined. Whitehead’s metaphysics of location is 
strongly analogous to the metaphysics of information. If a field of spatio-temporal 
extension is a field of semantic extension, an actual occasion is a semantic space. And if 
an actual occasion is a process of becoming, semantic space is a process of solidarity and 
a space of engagement. Finally, if a concrete thing in the physical world is instantiated as 
an event, then a concrete thing in the semantic world presents itself as an engagement of 
the event.  
 
Degree 
 
The claim that integration is a metaphysical fundamental raises many interesting puzzles, 
one of which, as I explain further below, concerns the semantics of the word ‘one’. Our 
biologically inter-connected world, which is an object of one semantic grammar, is 
ontologically unifying. However, human history suggests that the world is in fact 
complex, chaotic, and even incoherent. How can the integration hypothesis be reconciled 
with the natural disasters and human calamities all around us? The answer to this question 
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may be found in the notion of disintegration, which hides itself in the shadow of 
integration. When something disintegrates, extraneous things are removed, often resulting 
in some sort of injury or suffering. But this suffering may turn out to be a stage toward 
higher, wholistic integration. In other words, disintegration may be an element that 
enhances the notion of integration by means of the elimination of miscellaneous 
accretions.8  
What integration aims at is ‘one’, which may be either individual or collective. 
When it is not clarified, the ‘one’ of integration is ambiguous or vacuous. In a monistic 
ontology, this ambiguity should be understood as referring either to an individual or to 
the totality of all individuals. This possibility is supported by the idea that all objects are 
individuated, not by the principle of identity, but rather by fields of spatio-temporal 
extension based on the quantum field model. Spatio-temporal extension in the quantum 
field model does not separate individuals from the totality dualistically; rather, it allows 
them to have levels of dimensions or plural identities in accordance with the objectives 
of the inquiry at hand. The notion of an object in the quantum field model can be 
contrasted both with the Scholastic idea that individuals are primitive and irreducible and 
also with Leibniz’s idea that the individuality of an individual is reducible to an essential 
property (Dorato and Morgant 2013).   
  
On the one hand, integration is realized externally in accordance with the number 
of individuals involved. On the other hand, integration is instantiated internally in 
accordance with the scope of the integrity of an individual. The integrity or unity of an 
object may satisfy a minimal condition in order to maintain its individuality or may 
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choose to satisfy the maximal condition in order to realize its own potential. Of course, 
the integrity or unity of an object is not determined by its essential properties; rather, it is 
constructed at a level of abstraction in the cosmos. Such an abstraction takes place as fluid 
connections or solidity in semantic fields and not as substances or their elements in 
traditional temporal space. Therefore, the units of abstraction in semantic fields present 
integration, not as a mechanstic calculus, but rather as probable and uncertain phenomena. 
In the foregoing I have advanced the idea that integration is a metaphysical 
fundamental. If one accepts an evolutionary account of the human mind, then one should 
also accept the powers of the minds of physical things. In support of this idea I have 
argued for the following three claims: that integration is information consciousness, that 
integration is a dispositional power, and that if all things are bundles of information, then 
information is ubiquitous. The idea that integration is a metaphysical fundamental is 
plausible to the extent that these three claims are correct.9 
 
 
Notes: Many thanks to Gyu-Seong Lee and John Michael McGuire for the idea of 
integration and for improving the reasoning of the paper, and to Kang Soo Lee, Kwang-
Sae Lee, Inchae Chung, Kai-Yuan Cheng, Szu-Ting Chen, Ellie Hua Wang, Chung-Ying 
Cheng, Yi Guo, May Sim and two audiences at the CCPEA 2018 and the WCP 2018 for 
helpful comments, conversations or encouragements about this material. 
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1 Chalmers (1996) understands the psychological concept of the mind in terms of the 
causal or explanatory roles it plays in human action, the phenomenal concept of the 
mind in the ways the mind feels, and consciousness as a subjective character of human 
experiences. My knowledge of consciousness comes from my own case, not from any 
external observations. On this view, the position of eliminativism is implausible, as 
there is an asymmetry between our knowledge of consciousness and our knowledge of 
anything else. 
2 The famous Bat Argument introduced by Nagel (1974; 1986) runs something like this. 
Suppose that all possible knowledge about the physical facts of bats is known. But the 
statement that bats are conscious as well as its negation are both compatible with that 
supposition. Thus, the supposition could not explain the first-person experience of bats. 
Nagel is willing to accept the hypothesis that all organisms may undergo mental 
experiences which we human beings cannot understand from our first-person 
perspective. 
3 Molnar’s thesis is contingent because it is based merely on the fact that there is an 
analogy between the physical and the mental (Molnar 2003). But one cannot achieve 
the intentionality of the physical through this contingent thesis. If physical 
intentionality is a matter of necessity, not contigency, then the physical must be 
identical with the mental or else physical intentionality must be conceptually primitive.  
4 The world should be seen, not as a totality of individual objects, but rather as structures 
of information from top to bottom. Bits of informations are the ultimate ontological 
entities. If reality and information truly coincide then the Cartesian separation of mind 
and body cannot be maintained, and information does not reside in some Platonic third 
world. In the past, one could reach information through mathematics and physics, but 
recently matter is said to be approachable through information: A bit is not obtained 
from an it; rather, an it is obtained from a bit (Floridi 2010).   
5 Lee (1994) observed that the distinction between narrow and wide content is not a strict 
one, and many cases do not seem to admit this distinction at all. Depression, for 
instance, leans toward the narrow content and may be related to a lack of proper inter-
personal content. And the notion of wide content may be subdivided further into inter-
personal content and inter-agentic content. This subdivision may be needed for the sake 
of the integration of everyday life. 
6 The words ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ should not be understood in the dualistic tradition.  
7 Chalmers (2010) interprets the ‘singularity’ as the critical point of an intelligence 
explosion in which artificial intelligence surpasses human intelligence. Kurzweil 
(2007) observes that the rate of technological progress doubles every ten years and that 
this progress will continue until the critical point of the singularity. As the singularity 
of the Big Bang is the critical point from which the notions of space and time derive 
their meaning, the singularity of artificial intelligence may be understood as the critical 
point at which the extension of ‘human beings’ is no longer confined to the natural 
human species. 
8  The pain and suffering caused by disintegration is an issue that deserves further 
examination. 
9 This draft was read at two sessions, one for CCPEA (Conference on Contemporary 
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Philosophy in East Asia) August 9-11, 2018 in Taipei, Taiwan, and another one for 
WCP (World Congress of Philosophy) August 13-20 in Beijing, China.  
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